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Abstract: Privatization and informalization of production, land fragmentation and the 
agrarian crisis in India has forced a significant fraction of rural households to 
underconsume and widened the income gap at a time of relatively high economic growth. 
Despite the significant role of the state in precipitating and intensifying this crisis, and in 
vindicating Polanyi’s notion of a double movement, the state has also invested in social 
schemes such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). Seven 
years after this scheme was first implemented, there is growing evidence of a seemingly 
contradictory picture of the NREGS. This paper reviews current literature on the 
performance of the scheme. The paper aims to answer two questions. First, how has the 
program performed in mitigating underconsumption in rural areas? Second, how has it 
changed social relations?  
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Social Reproduction in the time of Neoliberalization: The Role of the Employment 
Guarantee in India  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Social protection policies are increasingly gaining much prominence in non-OECD 
countries such as in China, Brazil, India, and South Africa among others. In India, the 
ruling coalition has placed emphasis on public works programs and social security for 
workers in the unorganized sector in its Common Minimum Program. Most significantly, 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) passed in 2005 and enacted in 
2006, was lauded as a landmark legislation – a “historic opportunity” to transform 
socioeconomic conditions in the country (Shah, 2004). Given the outbreak of farmer 
suicides, starvation deaths, reports of high levels of malnutrition and growing inequities, 
this was indeed a welcome piece of legislation.  
 
Despite skepticism and criticisms about the effectiveness of the program, there is no 
doubt that it has changed the economic situation of the rural population, at least in some 
parts of the country. The program has also spurred numerous studies investigating the 
impact of the program at various spatial levels. How might we view this “landmark 
legislation” as a contradiction in a neoliberal milieu? Notwithstanding criticisms that this 
government program is (potentially) prone to rent-seeking, corruption and inefficiencies, 
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other critics have argued that as a social protection policy it might make neoliberal and 
structural adjustment policies more palatable (e.g., Li, 2009; Mingione, 1985; 
Mkandawire, n.d.). Such a view is borne out in the literature that suggests that social 
protection would allow accumulation of human capital, improve infrastructure to 
facilitate interlinking of markets, improve growth prospects (Gentilini and Omamo, 
2011), or that public works programs such as those facilitated by NREGA would increase 
market efficiency and productivity and reduce objections to greater flexibility in labor 
regulations (Keefe and Palaicos,). The inherent merit to providing social protection 
appears to be subsumed by the larger objectives of productivity, efficiency and growth.  
 
In this paper I review existing literature on the impacts of NREGA using a specific 
theoretical lens of social reproduction. The paper poses two questions: how has this 
program fared in providing the means for the reproduction of human life and does it offer 
a change in existing social relations of production.  
 
 
2. Social Reproduction 
 
2.1 The Basis for Capitalist Production: Reproduction of Labor  
 
From a Marxian perspective, social reproduction has to do with the reproduction of the 
labor force, which is commoditized in capitalist production, and the maintenance of class 
relations. Labor creates new value but is not created by capital and contributes to the 
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maintenance of the industrial reserve army of labor, also referred to as the relative surplus 
population or the laboring surplus population (Mingione, 1985). Labor itself is a 
“special” commodity (also a fictitious commodity). Social reproduction is associated with 
conditions of capitalist accumulation both because labor is an important input into the 
production process and because it affects the consumption capacity. The production of 
surplus value is dependent on the reproduction of workers. This not requires the 
consumption of goods to replenish energy and sustain workers life, but also is dependent 
on activities undertaken to consume those goods as well as the inculcation of social 
norms etc. Further, this is needed for present workers but capital accumulation is also 
dependent on the reproduction of future workers. This constitutes all labor undertaken in 
household tasks and care work. When reproductive work is carried out by members of the 
household or community and unremunerated then it becomes invisible. Marx recognized 
the continual process of creating human beings, satisfying their needs, recreating their 
needs and reproducing human beings as part of a historical process in The German 
Ideology and Engels in the preface to Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State identifies materialist production and human reproduction as the basis of a 
materialist conception. However, the interdependence of production and reproduction 
was not given much weight in later analyses (Humphries, 1987: 11; Marshall, 1994: 65).  
 
Feminists, on the other hand, perceive social reproduction as not only the social act of not 
only reproducing labor but also reproducing human life in general, which includes 
satisfaction of basic needs. In this they have played a significant role in highlighting the 
historical role imposed on women, and analyzing the importance domestic labor to the 
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capitalist system. In some cases, however, the discussion tends to be focused on gender 
relations and sexual division of labor to the exclusion of an analysis of production 
(Ramamurthy, 2010).  
 
An alternative approach is to adopt a dialectic understanding of the relationship between 
production and reproduction to analyze social reproduction. Hence in this paper attention 
is paid not only to the invisible, feminized work carried out by women, but also the 
reproduction of general features of the relationship between labor and capital 
(Ramamurthy, 2010; also Marshall 1994). More specifically, the focus will be on the 
rural proletariat and semi-proletariat – the target of the employment guarantee program, 
NREGS. Such an understanding of social reproduction analyzes the economic roles of 
gendered persons in capitalist societies. It also recognizes the role of institutions such as 
the state, familial and kin relationships, markets, and institutions governing access to 
environmental assets and resources in facilitating and perpetuating social reproduction. 
These determine the costs and incomes of labor, economic and human development (also 
see Mingione, 1985). 
 
 
2.2 Social Reproduction under Neoliberal Capital 
 
In discussing social reproduction, Mingione (1985) suggests two contradictions that arise 
from the structures of demand and social reproduction and result in a specific 
wage/income structure and a specific capacity for commodification of goods and services 
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(these relate to the costs of production and the consumption capacity in the economy).   
A) Capitalist accumulation under the condition of high degree of commodification is 
likely to increase the costs of labor reproduction undesirable to capital. B) Accumulation 
under the condition of a disproportionate expansion of surplus labor is likely to lead to 
insufficient commodification and strong overproduction tendencies. He further adds the 
second contradiction in “developed” countries was previously hidden due to shifting of 
this contradiction to “developing” countries. However, under the current conditions of 
globalization it is no longer possible for countries to be protected against these 
contradictions.  
 
With a high degree of surplus labor and until recently a high dependence on subsistence 
and own-account production, India could be said to be suffering from the second 
contradiction. Under a neoliberal milieu, the country has been experiencing high growth 
but low labor absorption and high degree of rural dispossession due to land grab by the 
state or state-supported private entities, inability to withstand competition in international 
agricultural markets, and closing of forests and other natural resources for conservation 
(Li, 2009) or “green” markets. The surplus population, relative to its utility to capital, is 
thus viewed as a potential reserve army of labor that is an important condition for capital 
accumulation. But acknowledging the need for a surplus population does not address how 
this population will be kept alive in order to be useful to capital when needed (Li, 2009).  
 
Some have rightly argued that the highest costs of structural adjustment programs under 
neoliberalism are paid by countries of the global South and even within these countries 
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on those who are exist on the economic, social and political margins of society (e.g., 
Floro, 1995; Floro and Hoppe, 2008). Despite the slew of fallouts from privatization, and 
informalization, these policies are part of the new labor-capital and people-state contracts 
(see Bakker and Gill, 2008). Yet it is during this time that there has been an increased 
push toward safety nets, employment schemes and a rhetoric concerned with sustaining 
human life as reflected in the Beijing Platform for Action and Millennium Development 
Goals.  
 
Gentilini and Omamo (2011) provide a brief history of investment in programs with 
welfare implications. They note that institutions such as the World Bank began 
advocating for “adjustment with a human face” approach and inclusive growth in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as a response to the effects of market-oriented and trickle down 
growth policies. The Asian economic crisis, rising food prices and energy crises further 
shaped what is now referred to as social protection policies, which take on a broader and 
more “holistic” approach toward poverty alleviation and welfare programs (Devereux, 
2003; Ravallion, 2003). This has percolated to policy making in individual countries. For 
instance, the 11th Five Year Plan in India has advocated for social protection programs as 
a key to reducing poverty, increasing equity and engaging in inclusive growth (Dev, 
2011). This provides a context for the implementation of the NREGS beginning 2006. 
 
 
3. NREGS and MGNREGS 
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India has had a history of diverse and patchy welfare arrangements with only an allusion 
to a coherent social policy (Palriwala and Neetha, 2009). These programs were put in 
place to mitigate the inability of markets or the family (Palriwala and Neetha, 2009) to 
provide for social reproduction. Compared to the presence of welfare states in high-
income countries of the Global North, the Indian state plays a smaller role in welfare 
provision in countries of the Global South. Gough (2004) thus refers to it as welfare 
regimes rather than welfare state regimes as an analytical term.  
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005, later modified to 
Mahatma Gandhi NREGA (MGNREGA) is a right to work scheme that promises 100 
days of work to one member of all rural households willing to participate in unskilled 
manual labor at the statutory minimum wage for the program. According to the 
legislation, work has to be provided within 15 days of receiving an application to work 
barring which the household/ individual is entitled to unemployment allowance. 
Provisions in the Act mandates at least one-third of the workers should be women. The 
place of work is also mandated to provide childcare services if more than five children 
under the age of six are present. Additionally, NREGA projects are to be undertaken to 
improve infrastructure and facilities within the villages after consultation with the 
villagers. The legislation is a result of efforts by different groups to draw attention to the 
food crisis and lack of employment faced by rural poor in India (Khera and Nayak, 
2009). Even though the initial demands of the citizen’s draft were diluted in the final 
enactment of the legislation, Khera and Nayak (2009) claim that it is a significant step 
forward in creating a social security mechanism for the poor.  
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An employment guarantee program such as the NREGS is expected to mitigate problems 
of livelihoods and employment generation. It is expected to generate income and increase 
consumption levels of those willing and able to participate in unskilled manual labor. 
Hence it could reduce poverty and improve food security, and thereby help achieve MDG 
goals (Antonopolous, 2007). It could also improve social infrastructure, depending on 
what projects are undertaken. Drawing on the views propounded by development 
economists such as Nurkse and Hirshman, Hirway (2007) also suggests that investing in 
productive assets by expanding employment opportunities would crowd-in investment. 
By generating employment and essentially instituting a wage floor through the guarantee 
of a certain wage, it could improve the bargaining position of individuals and households 
and reduce labor market distortions (Dutta et al., 2012). Just as importantly, it could go a 
long way in creating a sense of entitlement rather than charity thus empowering a 
significant majority of the Indian population (Dutta et al., 2012).  
 
 
3.1 Effect on Relative ‘Surplus’ Population -- NREGA Participation  
 
In February 2006 NREGS was implemented in 200 of the most economically backward 
rural districts in the country, employing 21 million households and generating 905 
million person days of work. An additional 130 districts were brought under the purview 
of the scheme in April 2007, benefiting a total 33.9 million households and generating 
1.4 billion person days of employment. Under phase III beginning April 2008, the 
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program was operational in 596 rural districts in the country (Ministry of Rural 
Development, 2010).  
 
Data from the 66th NSS1 Round show that except for five states (Assam, Bihar, Punjab, 
J&K, U.P.), the female share of employment in NREGS (48.1%) is higher than the 
mandated 33 percent (Dutta et al, 2012). These aggregate figures correspond to data 
obtained from fieldwork. Khera and Nayak (2009) surveyed 1060 NREGA male and 
female workers in 98 work sites across ten districts in five states (Bihar, Chhatisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh). Their sample consisted of 32 
percent female workers. Their survey revealed that only 30 percent of the female 
respondents had reported earning cash income prior to NREGA work. Most of this was 
casual, insecure, irregular, hazardous, and most of all reinforced gender biases at the 
place of work. A study of NREGS workers in three states Karnataka, Orissa and Madhya 
Pradesh revealed that 59 percent of female workers belonged to the poorest quartile, 
while over 80 percent of male workers belonged to the second poorest quartile (Dev et 
al., 2006 cited in Dev 2008). Joshi et al. (2008) also find that the NREGS has also 
encouraged women of upper castes with limited mobility and low participation in the 
wage market to work under the aegis of NREGS. This indicates an increase in female 
participation in formal wage work and a mitigation on “invisible” constraints faced by 
many women workers (also, Azam, 2012; Pankaj and Tankha, 2009)  
 
 
1 NSS or NSSO stands for National Sample Survey Organisation.  
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Based on 2009-2010 NSS data, Dutta et al. (2012) find that households of all 
consumption quintile have job cards, demand NREGS work and participate in NREGS 
work. While the demand rate of the poorest consumption quintile is 0.609, the demand 
rate for the richest quintile is 0.309. However, participation rate of the poorest quintile is 
0.335 whereas that of the richest quintile is 0.138. Thus, participation rates of the poor 
are higher than that of the non-poor overwhelmingly due to the demand for NREGS work 
by the former but non-poor households also demand NREGS work. Based on a survey 
based on ten districts in six north-Indian states in 2008, Dreze and Khera (2009) report 
that 81 percent of the sample households lived in kaccha houses, 71 percent did not have 
electricity and 61 percent were illiterate. Pankaj’s (2008) study of districts in Bihar and 
Jharkhand finds that landholdings and the value of assets held by beneficiaries is lower 
than non-beneficiaries across all caste categories, though the asset base of SC and ST 
households is even lower than that held by beneficiaries in other caste categories.  
 
Pankaj et al. (2008) reveals that in Bihar the beneficiaries are overwhelmingly SCs (53 
percent), landless (80 percent) and casual agricultural workers (78 percent). In Jharkhand, 
the same study found that households that benefit the most are STs (48 percent), landless 
(30 percent), small and marginal farmers (49 percent), and casual workers in agriculture 
(40 percent) and non-agriculture (35 percent)2. These results are generally corroborated 
by data from other field studies that find high participation rates by SCs, STs and OBCs 
2 SC (scheduled castes), STs (scheduled tribes) and OBCs (other backward castes) have historically borne 
the brunt of caste oppression.  
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(e.g., Dutta et al., 2012; Dreze and Khera, 2009; Pankaj, 2008; Pankaj and Tankha, 2009) 
though Azam (2012) finds no evidence of higher labor force participation by SCs and 
STs and Jitendra (2013) reports that participation by SCs and STs may be declining.  
 
The empirical literature, suggests that availability of wage work has increased for able-
bodied women, SCs and STs. Moreover, MGNREGS also offers higher wage 
opportunities to those in the lowest consumption quintiles and hence are likely to be the 
most poor. The program thus appears to fulfill one of its objectives of offering the 
possibility of wage work to the “surplus” population. While official data from the 
MGNREGS website suggests that 99.4 percent (52.53 million) of the total 52.865 million 
households that demanded work in 2009-2010, Dutta et al. (2012) note that this data may 
not accurately reflect “true” demand. Instead they employ data from NSS 66th Round 
(2009-2010) to estimate participation rates.  
 
Despite its generally positive performance, NREGS faces some limitations that have 
implications for social reproduction. First, the participation rate3 calculated by Dutta et 
al. (2012) certainly indicates a higher level of participation by the marginalized SCs and 
STs at 42 and 33 percent respectively, which is higher than the participation rate of the 
“other” caste category (15 percent). Nevertheless, that only 42 and 33 percent of SCs and 
STs are able to get NREGS work given that it is intended to be a demand driven program 
is of concern.  
3 Dutta et al. (2012) calculate participation rate as (1-Ri)Di where Ri = proportion of households that 
demanded work but did not get it and Di = proportion of household who wanted work in the scheme. 
Participation rate itself is interpreted as share of rural households working in MGNREGS.  
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Second, while the NREGS allows for a maximum of 100 days of work, the average 
number of days worked under the scheme has been very low. Dutta et al. (2012) based on 
NSS data calculate the average number of days for all rural households in 2009-2010 was 
nine days. The mean for the poorest consumption quintile was 11.3 days and for the 
richest quintile was 5.5 days. However, the mean person days of NREGS work for the 
poorest quintile participating in NREGS is 33.7 days, it is slightly higher for the richest 
quintile at 40 days (Dutta et al., 2012). Based on government’s own reports on the 
NREGS, Jha and Gaiha (2012) report that average person days of employment under 
NREGS per household decreased from 39.06 in 2009-2010 to 30-63 in 2011-2012. The 
mean percentage of households that completed 100 days of work also showed a slight 
decrease from 3 percent to 2.27 percent.  
 
Third, NREGS work more often than not excludes separated or divorced women living in 
their natal homes, female headed households, the elderly and the handicapped. Further, 
due to the provision of one job card per household, it normalizes heteronormative 
households. Fourth, high productivity norms exclude the elderly and disabled from 
participating in NREGS work (Palriwala and Neetha, 2009). 
 
Thus, despite the relative success of providing jobs to women, SCs and STs, groups that 
typically constitute the marginalized population in the country, the MGNREGS does not 
provide jobs for all of the population that might be considered surplus relative to their 
utility to capital. Thus, not only is the demand for NREGS jobs unmet, but even for those 
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with jobs, the mean number of days is less than the promised 100 days of work. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of some members of society such as the elderly and disabled 
excludes what Marx referred to as the stagnant part of the relative surplus population. 
This suggests that despite the rhetoric, social protection is being extended only to able-
bodied persons who constitute the floating or latent parts of the relative surplus 
population. In other words, it appears to provide for those who might be able to 
participate in a capitalist labor market with its demands on productivity and efficiency.  
 
One way to understand the contradiction of social protection such as MGNREGS at a 
time when the state is increasingly abdicating its role in development and making welfare 
provisions would be to suggest that social protection that is offered is minimal - a way to 
avoid the embarrassment of under-consumption that is plaguing a significant proportion 
of the Indian population. Another way to understand the contradiction is to suggest that it 
is an attempt to mitigate the possibility of widespread social unrest and create “dangerous 
classes” (Chatterjee, 2008), a Polanyian ‘double movement’. Neither seems implausible 
in the Indian context though it would be disingenuous to view these as the only 
explanations.  
 
 
3.2 Wages and Entitlements  
 
It is expected that the creation of jobs will not only reduce the amount of “surplus” 
population, but MGNREGS wages will act as a price floor. The latter is significant 
 14 
because MGNREGS jobs are mandated to be at least at minimum wage. This would 
increase the wages of both male and female workers by improving their bargaining 
capacity. Further, many women workers have expressed a preference for working at 
NREGS worksites because many worksites are situated in their villages, and because in 
non-public casual work they often face sexual and other forms of harassment. However, 
the results from existing studies provide mixed results.  
 
Based on investigation of a district each in four states, Pankaj and Tankha’s (2010) study 
reveals that despite some success in Himachal Pradesh, actual wages of women workers 
is less than the prescribed minimum wage. However, it was greater than the market wage 
in the districts surveyed in the four states. Pankaj’s (2008) study in Bihar and Jharkhand 
also reveals a similar pattern wherein except for Supaul district, worksites in the 
remaining five districts in Bihar paid lower than minimum wage.  In Jharkhand, none of 
the three districts surveyed worksites consistently met the minimum wage requirement 
even though wages were close to the minimum wage. Similarly, Dutta et al (2012) find 
that a comparison of average wage rates for NREGS work (obtained by MGNREGS 
spending on unskilled labor divided by total person days of employment) with average 
wages in private casual labor (obtained from NSS reports) does not yield a clear positive 
picture. While at the all India level, rural wages and MGNREGS wages are close, for half 
the states MGNREGS wages are lower than the average wage rate for casual labor. Given 
the extent of rationing where demand for jobs is greater than participation, they argue that 
it is not possible for casual non-public works wage rate to be higher than MGNREGS due 
to competition for labor (also see Ravi and Engler, 2013 who obtain similar results).  
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Azam (2012) finds that real wages have increased but only because of an increase in real 
wages for women whose market wages tend to be much lower than minimum wages. 
Except for HP, Kerala, TN and Uttarakhand, NREGS wages are much higher than market 
wages for women in the remaining states.  
 
Nevertheless, the existence of an employment guarantee program is likely to have an 
effect on labor-capital relations in favor of labor. It offers an alternative to exploitative 
wage relationships if the NREGS stipulation banning contractors is followed. In states 
where MGNREGS wages are above the market wage, under certain conditions of 
increased labor demand it could cause an upward revision of rural wages. Another 
important aspect of the MGNREGS is that while it highlights the role of a “benevolent 
provider” (Dreze and Khera, 2009), it has created awareness of entitlements and 
politically mobilized people, thus likely changing the state-people relation.   
 
 
3.3 Impact on Incomes and Consumption   
 
NREGS departs considerably from previous workfare programs implemented in post-
Independent India in few respects. One distinguishing feature is that it is demand driven 
and implicitly accepts that the problem of under-consumption is endemic and not just 
restricted to times of natural disasters (Palriwala and Neetha, 2009). Despite the low 
number of average days of work under MGNREGS, income derived from this work is not 
insignificant for some states and some sections of the beneficiaries. In a survey of 11 
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villages and 15 NREGS worksites in two blocks in Villipuram district (Tamil Nadu), 
about 41 percent respondents declared that NREGA had been their only source of income 
during the lean agricultural months. These included agricultural labor but also marginal 
farmers who were disinclined to work uncultivable land (Narayanan, 2008). Chhabra et 
al. 2009 (cited in Dev, 2011) finds that the share of NREGS income in total wage income 
was substantial for the districts surveyed in Madhya Pradesh - 18.6 per cent, 25.8 per cent 
and 16.6 per cent in the kharif, rabi and summer agricultural seasons respectively; the 
share of NREGS income to total income, however, was less than 10 percent. Pankaj’s 
(2008) study also produced similar results. The contribution of NREGS income to total 
income was 8.4 percent in Bihar and only 2.4 percent in Jharkhand. The contribution of 
NREGS income was highest for SCs (11.74 percent), landless households (8.9 percent) 
and marginal farmers (7.9 percent) in Bihar. In Jharkhand however, the contribution of 
NREGS income was less than 4 percent across all land and caste categories. In their study 
of four states (Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh) Pankaj and Tankha 
(2010) find that NREGS income in total earning of households with women workers 
ranged from 13 percent in Gaya (Bihar) to 27 percent in Dungarpur (Rajasthan). On 
average NREGS had a share of 18 percent for all four states. It should be mentioned that 
Dutta et al (2012), using aggregate NSSO data find that despite expectations and the fact 
that poverty rate at the all-India level is positively correlated with demand rates (r = 0.5), 
state-wide and national data show that rural poverty rates are only weakly correlated 
(0.13) with participation and MGNREGS spending per capita (r = -0.02) for 2009-10 and 
2010-11 (Dutta et al., 2012). 
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Income, alone, does not indicate how important NREG employment is to rural 
households. This is relevant due to the debate on whether there is indeed a crisis of social 
reproduction. While some have argued that decreasing caloric consumption in India and 
that the increasing incidence of casual work in rural India indicates a deepening crisis and 
rural distress, others have argued against it (e.g., Deaton and Dreze, 2009; Patnaik, 2007, 
2010; also see Himanshu, 2011; Thomas, 2012). While a discussion on the structure of 
rural employment is beyond the scope of this paper, a high expenditure on food would 
suggest that non-NREGS wage income is insufficient to guarantee a minimum level of 
consumption, i.e., the basic needs of social reproduction. On the other hand, if NREGS 
income allows households to potentially break out of a low income- low savings cycle or 
at the very least have sufficient to withstand economic shocks then it is telling of a very 
different economic scenario 
 
Ravi and Engler (2013) collected data from 1064 households from 198 villages in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2007 and 1008. Their study reveals an increase of monthly per capita 
expenditure on food by Rs. 25.8 (9.6 percent) and on non-food consumables by Rs. 11.17 
(23 percent). They also found that NREGS households were consuming one additional 
meal and at least one member of a NREGS household was consuming 3.2 additional 
meals per week. This suggests improved food security for NREGS household though it 
would be useful to know the gap that needs to be bridged to consider these households 
food secure. Further, Uppal (2009) found a weak but positive association between 
participation in NREGA by parents and anthropometric scores of children under the age 
of six. These measures taken as indicators of health outcomes suggest the possibility of 
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higher consumption by children though the results were not robust across econometric 
specifications.  
 
Chhabra et al (2009, cited in Dev, 2011) reports that respondents in Gujarat and Andhra 
Pradesh did not perceive NREGS income playing a role in addressing the issues of 
hunger, migration or illness. Other fieldwork studies suggest otherwise. A high 
proportion of NREGS workers spent the income earned on food, medical expenses and 
education (Dreze and Khera, 2009; Pankaj, 2008; Joshi et al., 2008). NREGS income was 
expended in categories that constitute the range of activities associated with social 
reproduction.  
 
Citing the case of seemingly successful programs such as the Maharashtra EGS and 
SGRY, Palriwala and Neetha (2009) note that while they enabled survival as opposed to 
a fate of starvation, they did not push people out of poverty or ensure economic 
independence, especially for women. They attribute this “crisis” to inadequate labor 
commodification and “familialism”. Ravi and Engler (2013), however, find that the 
probability of savings for NREGS households increased by 21 percent and savings by Rs. 
18.6. However, they conducted their survey in Andhra Pradesh, one of the states in which 
MGNREGS wages are greater than market wages, participation rates are among the 
highest, mean number of MGNREGS days worked is high, and per capita expenditure is 
also very high. It is unclear if MGNREGS has increased the savings capacity of 
households in other states. Further, despite the rationale of an endemic crisis underlying 
the MGNREGS, in reality implementation often takes on the character of a temporary 
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relief measure (Hirway, 2008; Ghosh, 2008) 
 
While NREGS work constitutes constructing assets that would be beneficial to the 
community, its intention is to ensure livelihoods and a minimum level of consumption. 
Studies based on fieldwork provide a wide variety of responses with respect to the impact 
of NREGA. Rural India is primarily agrarian, providing close to 52% of total 
employment and suffers from economic disarticulation. However, in field study sites, for 
a high proportion of respondents non-farm wage income constituted the major portion of 
their income and were yet highly dependent on NREGS income (e.g. Joshi et al., 2008; 
Pankaj and Tankha, 2010).  
 
The inability of the capitalist system to provide a living wage to the dispossessed has 
been termed by Bernstein (2004) as the central agrarian question. Thus a subsidy is 
required either through household production, charity, state provision, petty commodity 
production etc. (Gimenez, 1995). While previously subsistence or own-account 
production of agricultural or natural resource goods in rural India might have provided a 
wage subsidy, the attrition of such production to land grabs, competition from 
international markets and enclosure of forests and other natural resources makes such a 
subsidy less likely. Thus while rural households can no longer subsist purely on the basis 
of an agrarian economy, the wage system does not provide for the rural households 
either.  In other words, the real wage is less than what is required to reproduce labor and 
labor power. Under this situation, NREGS income becomes a likely source of subsidy to 
the capitalist economy system, in addition to domestic work, household production and 
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care work. Visible and invisible work provided by men and women takes on the costs of 
socially necessary labor and accepts a subordinate position in the process of capital 
accumulation (Bakker and Gill, 2003; Gimenez, 1995; Peterson, 2002; Ramamurthy, 
2010).  
 
3.4 Effect on care work and gender relations  
 
There has been considerable concern in India about the declining female labor force 
participation rate in India after an increase in the period 1999-2000 to 2004-2005. It has 
been argued that the earlier increase in female labor force participation was a result of 
agrarian distress. Thomas (2012) offers the following explanation. During a period of 
grave agrarian distress, with negative incomes as high as 19% and 36%) 16.9 million 
women of the total 18.5 million joined the rural agricultural labor force to alleviate 
decreasing household income. The just as sharp decline between 2004-05 and 2009-2010 
when 22 million women withdrew from the agricultural labor force, Thomas (2012) 
argues is indicative of improvement in India’s rural economy and is suggestive of the 
impact of MGNREGA. This is a view held by many others (e.g., Himanshu, 2013; Jatav 
and Sen, 2013).  
 
However, MGNREGA, in the period 2004-2005 to 2009-2010 was only able to employ 
2.5 million workers. At the same time, India is still under the throes of the agrarian crisis. 
An estimated 14,462 farmers committed suicide on average in the period 1995 to 2000 
and the period between 2001-2011 averaged 16,743 suicides for a total of 270,940 in the 
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period 1995-2011 (Sainath, 2013). So while the U-shaped female labor force function 
may have some merit, it cannot be the only explanation. In light of jobless growth, 
especially inadequate employment opportunities for rural women, NREGS work has 
offered many women the possibility of engaging in paid work, sometimes for the first 
time because NREGS work is associated with regularity and predictability, there is a 
lower chance of exploitative work, being a government job confers it some dignity; and 
since NREGS worksites are mandated to be within five kilometers of residence, it is 
socially and feasible work for women under existing gender norms (Khera and Nayak, 
2009). While in some cases NREGA is associated with the enforcement of gender 
inequities, it nevertheless allows the possibility of economic and “personal” 
independence (Khera and Nayak, 2009; Narayanan, 2008; Pankaj, 2010) 
 
Another significantly different aspect of the NREGS compared to its public works 
predecessors is its commitment to incorporate at least one-third women workers and 
provide childcare if the number of children under the age of six is greater than five. 
Despite the progressive legislation, however, the abysmal lack of crèche facilities at 
MGNREGA worksites in contravention of provisions of the program is a significant 
deterrent to the participation of women workers since childcare is gendered work (Dreze 
and Khera, 2009; Joshi et al., 2008; Pankaj, 2008). Yet another negative fallout of lack of 
childcare facilities is that when women with infants or very young children are forced or 
opt to participate in NREGS work, education of their older school-going children, 
sometimes as young as five or six years, may be disrupted so that they may perform care 
work instead (Bhatty, 2006; CESS, 2009; Narayanan, 2009). In some other cases, women 
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reported leaving the child alone at home unsupervised (50 percent of the respondents in 
the survey conducted by Narayanan, 2009) or brought to the site and left unprotected in 
harsh weather condition (Bhatt, 2006), or sent to anganwadis, balwadis4 or school 
depending on the age of the child and availability of such facilities close the village 
(Narayanan, 2009). Many respondents complained of experiencing stress and anxiety 
when childcare was unavailable. While some have argued against the necessity of 
providing a crèche on the worksite if the village has an anganwadi or school, such an 
argument does not account for the care of infants or very young children. Narayanan’s 
(2008) survey of mothers with young children in Villipuram district in Tamil Nadu 
reveals that close to 65 percent of the respondents were not even aware that NREGS 
work entitles them with access to a crèche.  
 
This problem highlights the importance of socialized childcare (including crèches, 
anganwadis and school) in the physical and mental wellbeing of many workingwomen, 
on whom the double burden of wage work and social reproduction is imposed. The 
relative low importance accorded to the provision of crèches suggests the continuing 
invisibility of care work and the impact of women and children who are drawn into this 
work. It also suggests the continued sexual inequities under capitalism reflected in the 
lack of access to the material conditions requisite for “daily and generational 
reproduction (Gimenez, 1982). The NREGS work provided by the state occurs under an 
economic system in which capitalism is the dominant mode of production. Women and 
4 Anganwadis and balwadis are government-sponsored and often government-run organizations providing 
child and infant care.   
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children are thus recruited in the care work of the surplus population of which the reserve 
army of labor forms a constituent part.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
The reduced viability and destruction of other modes of production in a dominant 
capitalist society has made social reproduction difficult and migration more desirable. 
Further, labor absorption has primarily resulted in precarious work, which is usually low 
paying and insecure. The destruction of rural industry and agriculture and forest based 
activities means that it is no longer possible for these activities to subsidize wage labor. 
Under this economic situation, NGREGS offers significant support to the business of 
social reproduction. This is clear from responses obtained by interviewing beneficiaries. 
However, NREGS falls short of provisioning for daily and generational reproduction and 
transforming gender and class relations in the following ways.   
 
First, despite being provided by the state, NREGS work, its contribution to basic 
consumption of the household and the care work that is provided by working women and 
children is invisibilized and continues to be subordinate to capitalist accumulation. 
Nevertheless, due to the historical specificity of institutions in the rural economy, along 
with spread on neoliberal ideologies, NREGS is viewed as an impediment to the 
development of the Indian economy, thus giving rise to a potential contradiction.  
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Second, income derived from NREGS work has definitely contributed to satisfying basic 
needs of households though it has not solved the problem of underconsumption both 
owing to inadequate work and inadequate income generated from this work. Moreover, 
due to the significant deficit in employment generation, NREGS even as it plays a role in 
social reproduction, due to the demands of capital appears to incorporate rural peoples in 
the calculus of capitalist cost-benefit analysis. This would suggest the maintenance of 
some portion of the population as the reserve army of labor.    
 
Third, in addition to the work carried out at NREGA sites, women continue to carry out 
care work, which increases their double burden, as is the case in different forms of 
market work. This is true despite the provisions of the act that mandate childcare 
facilities. Where women are not the primary care givers, the burden shifts to older 
children of the family, thus either making them responsible for their own care but also 
that of their siblings. It also reduces the possibility of graduating from secondary and 
higher secondary school and could reduce the possibility of “improved” avenues of social 
reproduction.  
 
Fourth, where employment is provided, it is provided to the traditional heteronormative 
household. Female-headed households, and those disabled, may be at considerable 
disadvantage because the NREGS fails to account for those who are not able-bodied and 
potentially useful for capital. Thus they still have to rely on the extended family for their 
reproduction. Further, because of the subordinate role that NREGS work assumes vis-à-
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vis capital it does not inherently challenge gender norms via the production process. 
Rather to the extent that women are able to break out of gender stereotypes, it is due to 
the social nature of the work.  
 
It is clear that despite the “rollback” of the state in some avenues, the state has not 
disappeared and continues to participate in economic and social life. Mingione (1985) 
differentiates between two potential interventions by the state. The first pertains to the 
direct provision of collective services such as health, education etc. These socialize the 
costs of “better reproduction patterns of the labor force”. Under neoliberalism, the state 
has increasingly pulled away from such functions. A second set of interventions by the 
state involves contributing money or basic consumption to ensure the survival of the 
population that is surplus to the demands of capital. Mingione suggests that this section 
of the population is maintained in a “frozen” state so that aggregate demand does not fall 
sharply and at the same time political consensus is maintained. This argument suggests 
that policies such as the NREGS are attempts by the state to seek legitimacy. However, 
such arguments offer little space for the impact of political mobilization and the political 
space created through progressive legislation. For instance, it is known that NREGS has 
been more successful in those states and districts with a degree of political mobilization. 
Further, even with the state there are contradictory tendencies that may operate at odds 
with each other. Therefore, following Li (2007 cited in Li, 2009), one could approach the 
contradiction between dispossession and protection as evidenced in countries like India is 
to “take live aspirations at their word, while acknowledging the contradictions that cause 
them to fall short. There is, from this perspective, no master plan, only assemblages 
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pulled together by one set of social forces, only to fragment and reassemble”.  What this 
paper offers is a preliminary analysis in the ways that MGNREGS falls short of 
provisioning for social reproduction.  
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